In the past few years I have sometimes wondered what it would take for the majority of Jews in countries such as Britain and America to decide that they no longer identified with the state of Israel. The election of very right-wing governments, the continuation of settlement building in occupied territories, the rising proportion of the Israeli population belonging to ultra-Orthodox — and thus thoroughly illiberal (some might say backward) — sects of Judaism might lead to them asking, well what’s this place got to do with me?
This feeling is exemplified by the incident with which Gregg Carlstrom, who reports from Israel for The Times and The Economist, starts his book. In March 2016 a squad of soldiers were attacked in the occupied territories by two young Palestinians armed with knives. A soldier was wounded before both attackers were shot. One was killed immediately. The other, Abdel Fattah-al-Sharif, lay on the ground wounded for a couple of minutes as the soldiers discussed what to do. Then one shot him in the head. This was all captured on video and then posted on YouTube.
Israeli courts, justice and media are for the most part raucous and independent
A rally in Tel Aviv in support of Elor Azaria, the Israeli soldier who killed a wounded Palestinian
The killer was a 19-year-old army medic called Elor Azaria. He was charged with manslaughter and got an 18-month sentence. But what was so different about his case was the support that Azaria received from ministers in the coalition government. Some actually praised the killer. One said he was a hero. His father was visited by the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who offered his sympathy. A petition was even raised to give him a medal and 63,000 signed it.
On investigation it was discovered that Azaria had posted racist material on Facebook. And to mark Holocaust Remembrance Day the army’s deputy chief of staff, Major General Yair Golan, made a statement reflecting on how there was a mood in Israel among some people reminiscent of attitudes in Europe before the Second World War. Golan came under immediate attack from the right. When the Israeli defence minister and former army chief, Moshe Ya’alon, refused to discipline him, he had to resign from government. His replacement was one of the politicians who had praised Azaria, the repulsive Avigdor Lieberman.
I’ve recounted this at length because it contains the various elements of the account of modern Israel given by Carlstrom in this useful primer for those seeking to understand Israeli politics and society. His “threat from within” is the rise of right-wing and ultra-religious trends that put a strain on the ties that bind Israel. And then, off to the fringes, there are the emboldened elements of what can only be called a Jewish fascism.
Carlstrom agrees with the analysis of President Rivlin of Israel (himself a fascinating and contradictory character) that the country is divided into four “tribes”. The largest for the moment is that of secular Zionists, including conservatives and “Tel Aviv liberals” — the kind of people who run the tourist agency and vote in Eurovision. The second is the “national religious”, ie mostly nationalist, right, which has particular support among the young. The third is the Arab minority and the fourth the ultra-Orthodox or Haredi.
This latter group is poor, under-educated (by choice), often parasitical and growing in number. And the way the political system works always makes it likely that a secular would-be Israeli prime minister will have to make an accommodation with the national religious and/or the Haredi.
Meanwhile, there is no great division over how to deal with the Palestinians. The once-powerful peace movement is moribund and Israeli voters are far more interested in how the economy is performing. In this mix Carlstrom describes a kind of slow Erdoganisation — an intolerance of contrary views, an inward gaze, a weakening of liberal values.
All this is worrying, but is there a point at which Israel will implode? Well, no. And in the end Carlstrom doesn’t address his own question. Countries rarely destroy themselves like that. Look at Venezuela — it’s still there despite everything. And it seems obvious, even allowing for Carlstrom’s gloom, that the modern and more liberal element in Israeli society also forms a part of the mix that the others cannot ignore or just trample on. For the most part Israeli courts, justice and media are still independent and raucous. Far more likely that Israel will just slowly become more divided and more disappointing.
As for the Jews in the diaspora, I don’t think they harbour the fuzzy, warm delusion about Israel that Carlstrom attributes to them. Their problem is starker. However, far from their ideal, it is still preferable — in the world of Isis, Assad and the new nationalisms — that Israel exists than that it doesn’t. It’s the ultimate binary choice.
On investigation it was discovered that Azaria had posted racist material on Facebook. And to mark Holocaust Remembrance Day the army’s deputy chief of staff, Major General Yair Golan, made a statement reflecting on how there was a mood in Israel among some people reminiscent of attitudes in Europe before the Second World War. Golan came under immediate attack from the right. When the Israeli defence minister and former army chief, Moshe Ya’alon, refused to discipline him, he had to resign from government. His replacement was one of the politicians who had praised Azaria, the repulsive Avigdor Lieberman.
I’ve recounted this at length because it contains the various elements of the account of modern Israel given by Carlstrom in this useful primer for those seeking to understand Israeli politics and society. His “threat from within” is the rise of right-wing and ultra-religious trends that put a strain on the ties that bind Israel. And then, off to the fringes, there are the emboldened elements of what can only be called a Jewish fascism.
Carlstrom agrees with the analysis of President Rivlin of Israel (himself a fascinating and contradictory character) that the country is divided into four “tribes”. The largest for the moment is that of secular Zionists, including conservatives and “Tel Aviv liberals” — the kind of people who run the tourist agency and vote in Eurovision. The second is the “national religious”, ie mostly nationalist, right, which has particular support among the young. The third is the Arab minority and the fourth the ultra-Orthodox or Haredi.
This latter group is poor, under-educated (by choice), often parasitical and growing in number. And the way the political system works always makes it likely that a secular would-be Israeli prime minister will have to make an accommodation with the national religious and/or the Haredi.
Meanwhile, there is no great division over how to deal with the Palestinians. The once-powerful peace movement is moribund and Israeli voters are far more interested in how the economy is performing. In this mix Carlstrom describes a kind of slow Erdoganisation — an intolerance of contrary views, an inward gaze, a weakening of liberal values.
All this is worrying, but is there a point at which Israel will implode? Well, no. And in the end Carlstrom doesn’t address his own question. Countries rarely destroy themselves like that. Look at Venezuela — it’s still there despite everything. And it seems obvious, even allowing for Carlstrom’s gloom, that the modern and more liberal element in Israeli society also forms a part of the mix that the others cannot ignore or just trample on. For the most part Israeli courts, justice and media are still independent and raucous. Far more likely that Israel will just slowly become more divided and more disappointing.
As for the Jews in the diaspora, I don’t think they harbour the fuzzy, warm delusion about Israel that Carlstrom attributes to them. Their problem is starker. However, far from their ideal, it is still preferable — in the world of Isis, Assad and the new nationalisms — that Israel exists than that it doesn’t. It’s the ultimate binary choice.
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