Tuesday, April 17, 2018

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost 1st Edition by Cathal Nolan (Oxford University Press)

In "The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost" (OUP, 2017), Cathal Nolan, a historian at Boston University argues that battles rarely decide the outcome of wars. “Exhaustion of morale and material rather than finality through battles marks the endgames of many wars.” He does not dismiss the importance of combat engagements, he just sees them as part of the process of one opponent grinding down another. It is also worth noting: “There was room in the past, as there appears to be in the present and likely will be in the future, for quick and complete victory if circumstances and events work out just right.”

This book starts with the Greeks and Romans and then quickly advances into Medieval Europe. It is mostly the story of European states fighting one another. The Ottoman Turks, the Americans and the Japanese make brief appearances here and there, but mainly when they are fighting Europeans. The book ends in 1945 with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Readers expecting coverage of insurgencies or of colonial wars that gave Europeans control of the Americas, Africa and Asia are going to be disappointed. No Cullodens, Quebecs or Seringapatams to see here. The book is littered with 36 maps and illustrations, which help explain the Hundred Years’ War and/or the Combined Bomber Offensive.


What wins war, according to Nolan, is not operational skill and/or the military genius of generals, but strategic depth. The Romans had it in spades, but most of Europe during the Medieval era did not, which is why its wars were so indecisive.

The contention that battles are not that significant is not new. Russell Weigley made a similar argument in the early 1990s with "The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo." A major difference, though, is that Nolan defines “decisive” for his readers: “Truly decisive battles translate into a lasting political outcome in the war of which they are a part.” He also argues that battles play a significant role in controlling the pace of attrition.

This argument should not be taken for the contention that big macro forces like economics and demographics decide the fate of nations and we need not study the sharp and ugly point of contact. “Wars among the major powers have in fact rearranged history,” he states bluntly.

Nolan is a gifted writer. He repeatedly strings verbs, adjectives and nouns together that add color and are evocative of the struggles that he examines. While he is covering the better part of two thousand years of history, he does not let his readers forget the essence of battle: it is the story of brave men on both sides; it is also the story of suffering, pain and death. Two of the more arresting images he presents are of the death of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1632, which is strikingly sudden. The other is of the Prussians 250 years later literally advancing over corpses before the battle of Gravelotte-Saint Privat during the Franco-Prussian War, and the cracking noise of horses and wagons crushing the bones and skulls of the dead. He also reminds his readers that a military campaign is more than just the glory and/or sorrow of combat, logistics is important. How men and horses get fed, where they water, where—or if—they get sleep or medical attention can all affect their morale and their rate of advance. Even urinating and defecation is important, because it can be a factor in maintaining the health of a unit in the field.

This book is an impressive undertaking, but its strengths are also its weaknesses. It is primarily an account of operational military history. Nolan understands the importance of the strategy and faults Napoleon for having none, but it is not a topic on which he dwells. A major reason that battle might not resolve anything is the value of the political object for which the belligerents are fighting. The more the belligerents—or even one—value what they are fighting for, the more they are willing to invest in the effort. The short wars of German unification were quick affairs not because of the tactical and operational skill of the Prussian Army and the genius of its chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke, but because Chancellor Otto von Bismarck established strategic objectives which the other side did not see as fundamental to its existence. He was also smart enough to use the conflicts to make incremental gains, altering the international landscape one war at a time, keeping his opponents isolated with diplomacy. Fighting for small objectives limited the potential of third party interventions. Things got more difficult for Bismarck not because the French were better than the Danes or the Austrians—though, they were—but because the Prussian chancellor wanted to take Alsace-Lorraine from France, which the French had considered an inherent part of their nation for two centuries.

This book is also primarily a study of ground combat, which is understandable. The short shrift given to sea power is a different issue. Nolan seems more comfortable in discussing how to advance into an enemy province than he is in how nations can use the water to their advantage. While naval power would appear to support his argument for the most part, there are several naval battles that altered the course of history: the Greek defeat of the Persians at Salamis, the Spartan defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami, Octavian’s defeat of Marc Antony at Actium, the French defeat of the British in the Chesapeake and the Japanese defeat of the Russians at Tsushima.

With those points made, this is a really interesting book. It is thought-provoking and offers readers numerous side suggestions on places to go if they are interested in exploring various topics at greater length.

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