Monday, April 16, 2018

The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain: A Reappraisal of Army and Air Policy 1938-1940 Hardcover – November 24, 2016 by Greg Baughen (Fonthill Media)



This book was one of those publications that are truly eye opening for military historians and students of warfare. I had no idea that the RAF was so dysfunctional during the "Phony War" preceding the German invasion of May 1940 as well as the Battle of France. French generalship and German innovation are the acknowledged reasons for the Third Republic's ignominious defeat, but abysmal British airmanship can also take its place along the preeminent reasons behind how events transpired.

Basically, the RAF was so traumatized by Army and Navy attempts to dissolve it after the First World War that its leadership embraced a singular and toxic variety of airmanship designed not to meet defense needs but to preserve the service's existence. Although the RAF succeeded in maintaining its independence, this mindset was sustained if not encouraged over the next twenty years by the stringent restrictions placed on British defense spending.

So, what does this mindset produce? An imbalanced force consisting primarily of a mixed bag of bombers earmarked for strategic operations (regardless of whether they are single engine, twin engine, or four engine), short range interceptors such as the Hurricane, Defiant and Spitfire (along with the trouble plagued Westland Whirlwind which only entered service in small numbers), hybrid fighters in the form of Blenheim light bombers with a machinegun pack strapped to the belly, and Army cooperation aircraft such as the Lysander that sacrificed much for short take off and landing capability. In a nutshell - strategic bombers of all hues, interceptors to combat enemy strategic bombers, and a few co-op planes to satisfy the "brown jobs."

Then comes war and Bomber Command suffers considerably when launching attacks against the German navy whereupon the RAF switches to night operations. The Advanced Air Striking Force is sent to France consisting of ten or more squadrons of Battle and Blenheim light bombers, as well as TWO fighter squadrons. Surely two squadrons would not suffice to escort that many bombers? Why that is not why fighters are in France, explained RAF leaders, as they are to protect our advanced bases not escort the Battles and Blenheims to their targets. Why no escort? Because the RAF was planning to use the Battles and Blenheims as night strategic bombers rather than provide support to ground troops.

Baughen's account of Battles spending months training for individual night missions rather than formation daylight attack missions explains to me why the Germans were able to push through the Ardennes virtually unmolested from the air. The British compound their misdirected emphasis on using Battles for strategic bombing by sending only four or six planes at a time to attack German ground troops once they decided to employ the planes in a ground attack role. But the piecemeal employment of Battles (and Blenheims) only present the Germans with juicy targets rather than the far more deadly threat of massed coordinated attacks by several squadrons with fighter escort.

Do the Battles and Blenheims ever get fighter escort? Yes, but primarily by the French who understand that pairing fighters with bombers represents a more effective means of attacking the Germans. The British also learn lessons but at great cost in men, machines and time. The loss rates of the Battles and Blenheims drop to acceptable levels but by then it is too late as their numbers dwindle and the German war machine captures Paris and reaches the coast.

In summarizing Baughen's literary and research efforts, I would say he has produced a ground breaking and objective account of RAF operations in France which is reason enough to buy this book. He uses archival sources for the most part and is a good enough author to make those often all too dry accounts much more readable. I finished this book with the belief that perhaps the Fall of France is a bit more complex than what we have been told.

I won't include an assessment of his coverage of the BoB, but I can assure it is also interesting and exhibits a high level of research. If you are wondering why the RAF did so much better defending its own territory, it is because it was doing the mission that its leaders designed it to do - protect Great Britain from air attack. They did NOT design it to provide support to the British and French army. The Battle of France portion is what drew me to this book as many works already exist on the Battle of Britain.

Must read for serious historians.

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