Kipnis’ meticulous analysis provides fascinating insights and valuable information on the Israeli decision-making process leading to the 1973 War, on the relationships between some of the key leaders, and on the relationships between Israel and the United States. Israeli historian Yigal Kipnis delves deep into the Israeli and American archives and reveals in this book that the big October 1973 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors could almost certainly have been avoided. Avoided, that is, if in the months preceding October 1973, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was facing elections, had not been so determined to block the ongoing peace negotiations with Egypt, and if U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (despite his misgivings) had not backed up her diplomatic hard line. Kipnis contradicts the conventional wisdom, arguing convincingly that it was Israeli political intransigence, not a failure of Israel’s military intelligence, that set the stage for the 1973 war.
The Hebrew-language original of 1973: The Road to War made great waves when it was published in Israel.This book is rich with data, important and engaging. It is a must read for scholars, students, and policy makers who wish to understand the pitfalls leading to 6 October 1973, when 500 Israeli soldiers had to face 80,000 Egyptian soldiers.
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